Abstract-We show attacks on five data-independent memoryhard functions (iMHF) that were submitted to the password hashing competition. Informally, an MHF is a function which cannot be evaluated on dedicated hardware, like ASICs, at significantly lower energy and/or hardware cost than evaluating a single instance on a standard single-core architecture. Data-independent means the memory access pattern of the function is independent of the input; this makes iMHFs harder to construct than data-dependent ones, but the latter can be attacked by various side-channel attacks.
Introduction
In cryptographic settings we typically consider functions which are easy to compute for a party having some secret piece of information, but are extremely hard to compute without it; inverting a trapdoor permutation or computing a pseudorandom function are examples. 
Moderately Hard Functions
Some applications, like password hashing or proofs of work, ask for "moderately hard" functions. Here, we have no secret; instead we want the function to be "somewhat" hard to compute. For example, in the password hashing application, a password server will not simply store login/-password tuples (login, pwd) in the clear, but instead a tuple (login, salt, f (salt, pwd)) for a random salt and some function f (·). This mitigates the consequences, should the password file get leaked: an adversary given (login, salt, y) will have to find a pre-image of y to impersonate login. As passwords often do not have much entropy, this is feasible by a dictionary attack where one evaluates f (salt, ·), starting from the most popular passwords.
To make this dictionary attack expensive, a moderately hard f is used. This puts some extra burden on the password server with every login attempt, but it puts a huge extra cost on an adversary running a dictionary attack, who must evaluate f a large number of times in a dictionary attack. A popular moderately hard function is PBKDF2 (PasswordBased Key Derivation Function 2), which essentially iterates a cryptographic hash function h, like SHA-256, n times, i.e., computes h(h(. . . h(salt, pwd) . . .)).
However, a password server will have to evaluate this function on its available hardware, like an x86 processor, whereas an attacker can run the dictionary attack on dedicated hardware like ASICs (application specific integrated circuits), where performing this computation costs (in terms of energy but also hardware) several orders of magnitude less than on a standard processor. 1 So we have not gained nearly as much in security by using a moderately hard function as one could have hoped for.
Memory Hard Functions
Percival [12] suggests memory-hard functions (MHF) as a means to get functions whose evaluation cost is more egalitarian across different platforms. The idea is to make memory -not computation -the main cost of evaluation. In this work we focus on data-independent MHF (iMHF), which are MHFs whose memory-access pattern is independent of the input. iMHFs are more restricted -and thus potentially harder to construct -than the more general datadependent MHFs (dMHF), but dMHFs succumb to various side-channel (in particular timing) attacks, and thus in some contexts iMHFs are preferred.
Energy and AT Complexity
In this work we analyze the memory-hardness of several iMHFs which were candidates at the password hashing competition 2 in terms of their AT and energy complexity. The amortized energy complexity of an algorithm measures the amount of electricity required by an ASIC implementing the algorithm per evaluation. This is particularly useful when considering the running cost of an ASIC. Indeed, many ASICs sold commercially for mining cryptocurrencies (which in several notable cases such as Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Ethereum boils down to precisely the type of brute-force attack on an MHF considered in this work), are often specified and compared to each other by looking at their rates of electricity consumption per evaluation. Furthermore, to make the results more technology independent, we also equip the model with a core-memory area parameter R ∈ R + which denotes the ratio between the amount of electricity used to evaluate the hash function and the amount of electricity needed to store the output of the hash function for an equivalent amount of time. 3 The AT-complexity of an algorithm is the product of the area of an implementation of the algorithm in an application specific integrate circuit (ASIC) and the time it takes the circuit to produce output. AT-complexity is often used as an efficiency estimate relating to the financial cost of implementing an algorithm, especially for repeated computations [14] . To upper-bound the cost of a brute-force attack on an MHF, we consider the amortized AT-complexity of our attack per instance of the MHF it computes. Similar to the energy complexity case, we make the results more independent of the technology used by parametrizing the complexity using a core-memory energy ratio R ∈ R + denoting the ratio of the size of an (on-chip) implementation of the underlying hash function and area required to store one of its outputs.
iMHFs as DAGs
The computation of an iMHF f (·) can often be captured by a DAG (directed acyclic graph) G f = (V, E) with one source and one sink. Let V = {v 0 , . . . , v n } be in some topological order (i.e., if (v i , v j ) ∈ E then i < j). We then assign a label i to each vertex v i , where the label 0 of the source v 0 is the function input, and the label n of the sink v n is the output. In general, the label i of a vertex v i is some "simple" function of the labels of its parents. For example the DAG underlying PBKDF2 is a path and the simple function mentioned above is the compression function h.
The iMHFs we consider are parameterised by a space parameter σ and a time parameter τ . Here σ specifies how much memory is required to evaluate the iMHF (in blocks which correspond to the output size of the underlying hashfunction, so for our f (·) that is 512 bits). Informally, parameter τ specifies how many times the memory is overwritten. Typical parameters are σ = 2 24 (corresponding to 1GB, block size of 512 bits) and τ a small integer, typically 1. For the iMHFs considered in this work the underlying DAG will typically be a path v 0 → v 1 → . . . → v n (n = σ · τ ) with some additional edges, and the simple functions will be cryptographic compression functions (like Blake, or the permutation used in the sponge of Keccak), sometimes mixed with even simpler functions like XORs. For concreteness, for this introduction let us consider an iMHF f (·) where the computation of a label i is always done by invoking some compression function h : {0, 1}
1024 → {0, 1} 512 . The iMHFs Rig.v2 and TwoCats we attack in this paper are of this form with h being Blake2.
The Naïve Algorithm
The specification of an iMHF f (·) describes how to evaluate the iMHF. We call this description a "naïve" algorithm N ; it typically computes the labels 1 , 2 , . . . , n sequentially, storing the last σ blocks (which means the underlying DAG has no long edges (v i , v j ) where j−i > σ). Thus, this algorithm invokes the hash-function n = σ · τ times sequentially, using σ memory for these n steps, which gives an energy complexity of ER(N ) ≈ n(R + σ) and similarly, the AT complexity is AT R (N ) ≈ n(R + σ). As typically n R , R and τ is a small constant, 4 this simply becomes
Attacks on MHFs
For an MHF to be memory-hard, there should not exist an adversarial algorithm A that evaluates the function at significantly lower energy or AT cost. This A is allowed to make parallel queries to the underlying hash-function h (as on an ASIC we can have many cores computing h) and the complexity can be amortized over many invocations (as an attacker will evaluate the function on many inputs). In this paper we analyze five MHFs which were submitted to the password hashing competition, and for all of them show that there exist algorithms which evaluate the function at energy and AT complexity much lower than n 2 . Ideally, we'd like these complexities to be Θ(n 2 ), but [1] showed that no such iMHFs exist, as for every iMHF there exists an attack achieving O(n 2 / log(n)). 5 Our attacks are (at least asymptotically) much stronger showing complexities of the form O(n c ) for different constants c < 2. The attacks in this work follow a general framework introduced by Alwen and Blocki [1] , who used it to analyse the Argon2i, Catena and Double-Buffer constructions (an earlier attack on Catena was presented in [6] ); we first map a given iMHF f to a graph G f , and the AT and energy quality of the iMHF can then be expressed in terms of the complexity of "pebbling" the graph G f . In [1] , these complexities were upper bounded in terms of the depthrobustness of G f (Theorem 1 in this paper).
Thus, finding attacks on iMHF boils down to showing that the underlying graph is not depth-robust. We give upper bounds on the depth-robustness of the DAGs underlying the iMHFs, leading to upper bounds on their energy and AT complexity via Theorem 1 as summarized in Figure 1 . Our main tools are a new result (Lemma 1) which bounds the depth-robustness of DAGs with not too many "short" edges, and a bound on the depth-robustness on graphs which are close to being "layered" (Lemma 2).
Our bounds (third column of Figure 1 ) are asymptotically way below the best possible n 2 / log(n). Concretely, we prove an upper bound O(n 1.75 ) for all functions, except for Pomelo, where we only get O(n 1.83 ) and Lyra2 where we get a better O(n 1.67 ). On a high level, the reason is that all constructions except Pomelo have underlying DAGs where most edges are either very short (of constant length) or very long (linear in n). Pomelo additionally has a large fraction of edges of length around √ n, which makes it more depth-robust (and thus gives a worse attack). In Lyra2 the long edges have a particular distribution (going only inbetween "layers") which allows for a better attack than the other constructions.
In light of such asymptotic attacks -which show structural deficiencies in all analysed iMHFs -we strongly believe they must be considered broken. This view is not generally shared. In particular, even after [1] published similar asymptotic attacks on several iMHFs including Argon2i, these were dismissed as not practically relevant by the proponents of the quick standardization of this MHF.
When one simply inputs parameters to the upper bounds we and [1] rigorously prove, the bounds are indeed not impressive (the fourth column in Figure 1 shows the attack quality at 1GB of memory, only for Rig.v2 we get an actual attack, saving a factor 2 in energy). However, one should keep in mind that these proven bounds increase with n and just give a rough upper bound. The actual attacks are certainly much better for several reasons: (1) The analyses are not tight (we often have to upper bound some quantities) and moreover only use a single property of the underlying graph, depth-robustness via Theorem 1, but for concrete graphs the attack is potentially much better than what we get 5 . The best proven asymptotic lower bound for any construction is Ω(n 2 / log 10 (n)) from [3] .
MHF/section/ref building block ER(A) ER(N )
ER(A) at 1GBR Rig.v2 §4 [7] Blake2 O(n 1.75 ) ≥ 2 3000 TwoCats §5 [9] Blake2 O(n 1.75 ) > 1 3000 Gambit §6 [13] Keccak Permutation O(n 1.75 ) ≥ 1/256 3000 Lyra2 §7 [11] Blake2 O(n 1.67 ) ≥ 1/6 3000 or Keccak Permutation Pomelo §8 [15] Basic Ops. O(n 1.83 ) ≥ 1/512 100 Figure 1 . (3rd column) Bounds on the amortized energy complexity of our attacks. (4rd column) The energy-quality of our attacks (cf. Def. 2) at 1GB of memory using core-memory parameterR from the last column (cf. Sec. 1.3). AT complexities behave basically identically.
from this worst-case analysis. (2) The attacks can certainly be improved via various heuristics tailored to the underlying graph.
To address the dismissal of their attacks, the authors of [1] simulated their attack on Argon2i, introducing various heuristics to further improve the attack quality [2] . As expected, the derived quantitative bounds were much better than the proven upper bounds in their paper, showing that Argon2i can be broken at 1GB memory even for the most "paranoid" suggested settings (in particular, even at an impractical τ = 6 number of memory passes) using only realistic amounts of bandwidth (we refer the reader to [2] for details). Such a simulation could in principle also be done for the attacks presented in this paper, and we expect a similar gap between the proven and the actual attack quality. We did not implement such simulations as there is not much to be learned from them.
Preliminaries

The Computational Model
We consider a computational model where an algorithm which can repeatedly make batches of queries to a hash function h (or another simple building block), before producing the final output. Between each call to h, we make explicit (the bit-length of) the state stored by the algorithm at that point in the computation. The complexity measure we ultimately consider is the cumulative memory complexity; that is the sum of the bit-lengths of all states stored during the computation. The desired security property (as motivated already by Percival in [12] ) is that no algorithm exists which can compute the MHF with too low cumulative memory complexity per input/output pair computed.
We fix the details of the model bellow following [3] . At its core, the computation consists of repeatedly invoking an algorithm A making any state maintained between invocations explicit. At invocation i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} algorithm A is given the state (bit-string) σ i−1 it produced at the end of the previous invocation. Next, A can make a batch of calls q i = (q We define the runtime time(A) to be the maximum running time of A in any execution (over all choices of x, r and h). Then the cumulative memory complexity and cumulative evaluation complexity are defined as
where |σ| is the bit-length of state σ, |q| is the dimension of the vector q, and max x,r denotes the maximum over all possible executions of A. Similarly, the absolute memory complexity and absolute evaluation complexity are defined as
We remark that these complexity measures are stricter than it is common, in particular, we treat h as a black-box and do not allow for optimisation like pipelining. But keep in mind that we use them to upper-bound the complexity of our attacks, therefore this strictness can only serve to strengthen our results. Using these tools, we can now define the complexity of an algorithm as follows. Definition 1. (AT and Energy Complexities) Let A be an algorithm which computes #inst(A) instances of an iMHF in parallel. Then for any core-memory area ratio R > 0 and any core-memory energy ratioR > 0 the (amortized) AT-complexity and the (amortized) energycomplexity of A are defined to be
Recall that an MHF is specified together with a (sequential) evaluation algorithm N , which we call the naïve algorithm. The understanding is that this is the algorithm used by the honest user (e.g. by the login server per login attempt).
With this in mind we consider an evaluation algorithm an "attack", if it has lower (amortized) complexity than the naïve algorithm, as this implies that the adversary has an advantage over the honest user. To this end, we define the following measure for evaluating the quality of an attack. Definition 2. (Attack Quality) Let f be an MHF with naïve algorithm N and let A be an algorithm for evaluating #inst(A) instance(s) of f . Then for any core-memory area ratio R > 0 and any core-memory energy ratioR > 0 the AT-quality and energy-quality of A is defined to be
In particular, if either quantity is greater than 1, then we call A an attack on f .
Basic Notation
We denote the set of natural numbers beginning at 0 as N = {0, 1, . . .}. For n ∈ N we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Also, by [a, b) (resp, (a, b]), we denote the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b − 1} (resp., {a + 1, a + 2, · · · , b}). We denote the set of real numbers greater than 0 with R + . We use the shorthand [N ] m to represent the number N mod m.
We also use the following terminology to talk about properties of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V, E). The indegree of a node v ∈ V is the number of edges ending in v. In symbols, indeg(v) := |{(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ V }|. More generally, the indegree of G is the largest indegree of any node in G. More precisely, indeg(G) := max{indeg(v) : v ∈ V }. If a p is a directed path in G, then it's length len(p) is the number of edges traversed by p. The depth of G, denoted depth(G), is the length of the longest directed path in G. For any set of nodes S ⊆ V , we write G − S to denote the DAG obtained from G by removing S (and incident edges).
Data-Independent MHFs and Graphs
We fix some useful definitions of which we shall make repeated use. Definition 3. Let G = (V, E) be a DAG and let e, d ∈ N.
We say that G is (e, d)-depth-robust if after removing any subset of at most e nodes, there remains a path of
The attacks in this work follow the general paradigm of determining parameters (and corresponding node set) for which each graph is (e, d)-reducible and then instantiating the generic attack of [1] . The complexity of that attack in terms of the underlying DAG and its reducibility are captured by the following theorem. Theorem 1 ([1]). Let f be an iMHF where the underlying DAG G = (V, E) has indeg(G) = δ and is (e, d)-reducible. 6 Then, for any integer g ∈ [d, n] and any core-memory area and energy ratios R > 0 andR > 0, there exists evaluation algorithm A of AT and energy complexity
Remark 1. Note that δ can be replaced with δ − 1 if for every node of inedgree δ in G, one of incoming edges is from the immediately preceding (in topological order) node.
Attacks on Classes of Graphs
Theorem 1 allows us to attack a graph by showing that it is depth-reducible. In this section we describe two general approaches to demonstrating depth-reducibility of graphs. These approaches are used in most of our attacks below.
Attacks Based on Edge Lengths
Assume G is a DAG on V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } with edges going from left to right (i.e., (v 
CHAIN GRAPH. Consider first a simple chain graph with all edges of length 1. Pick some γ, divide the graph into contiguous segments of γ nodes, and remove the last node at the end of every segment. Then no path of length γ remains in the graph. In other words, this graph is (n/γ, γ)-reducible for any γ ∈ [n].
ATTACKS ON A CHAIN + SHORT AND LONG EDGES. Now consider any graph G that has edges of length 1 or long edges of length at least β. Again, remove the last node of every γ-node segment. Any path in this graph will have fewer than n/β long edges total, and no more that γ − 2 short edges in a row before a long edge. Thus, G is (n/γ, γ n/β )-reducible for any γ ∈ [n].
To see how this helps to attack the graph, consider
. We can then apply Theorem 1 with g = e to get attack complexity approximately n 2 /β 1/3 . This attack can be generalized to a setting where all edges are of length at most α or at least β, for some α < β: simply remove segments of length α instead of single nodes, to get (nα/γ, γ n/β ) reducibility. We can then get an attack of complexity approximately n 2 (α/β) 1/3 . Finally, if a graph has a few edges of lengths between α and β, we can simply remove their end points. We thus obtain the following lemma. Lemma 1. If for some η, α, and β, G has at most η edges of length greater than α but less that β, then, for any γ, G is (η + nα/γ, γ n/β )-reducible. 
ATTACKS ON A GRAPH WITH UNIFORM EDGE LENGTH.
Suppose that the number of edges in G whose length is greater than 1 but less than is at most . Such a graph has mostly long edges. Thus, applying the above lemma to
. So, with g = e we can apply Theorem 1 to get attack complexity of approx. n 1.75 .
Attacks on Layered Graphs
We now show depth-reducibility of a general class of graphs called layered graphs. Definition 4. (Layered Graph) Let integer λ > 0 and e and d be functions from [λ] to N. For λ ∈ N and functions e, d :
)-perfectlylayered DAG, if the following holds: There exists a partitioning of V into subset V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V λ , such that 1) Edges never point to lower layers:
The following lemma lower-bounds the reducibility of a layered graph.
Proof: We construct a set of nodes S to remove and upper-bound the length of the longest path. Initially, S is the set of (at most m) nodes whose removal turns G into an Figure 3 . Illustration of Rig.v2 for m = 8 memory, λ = 2 layers and r = 1 round.
Then clearly |S| ≤ē. It remains to show that no path inḠ := G − S has lengthd. Consider any path p inḠ. As S ⊆S the DAGḠ is a subgraph of G . Moreover, for each i ∈ [λ], as S i ⊆S the path p can not contain a subpath of length d(i) with nodes in V i . Yet, once p leaves a node set V i for a node in V j with j > i, no edge ever leads back to V i . Thus, summing over all layers ofḠ, we get that len(p) ≤ d(i) =d.
Rig.v2
Rig was proposed by Chang et al. [7] . We analyze its second version and denote it Rig.v2 [8] . It is a passwordhashing function strongly influenced by the ideas of the Catena function [10] [8] ). For our analysis the choice of hash functions will make no difference. As input, Rig.v2 takes a password pwd, its length pwd , a salt s of at least 16 bytes, its length s , the number λ of iterations, the memory count m c , the number t of bits to be retained from hash output of the setup phase, the output length , and the number of rounds r. As output, Rig.v2 gives an -bit password hash h * r . The naïve algorithm N R to compute Rig.v2 from [8] is described by Algorithm 1 in the Reference Material. Using the original analysis from [8] , a single password computation using this algorithm can be done in time complexity O((λ + 1)mr) and space complexity O(m).
Graph Representation
The corresponding graph G R is parameterized by the number of rounds r, the number of layers λ per round, and the length m = 2 mc of layers. G R = (V, E) is defined as follows:
where V i,j := {v i,jm+k | 0 ≤ k < m} denotes the j-th layer of the i-th round. Every vertex v i,jm+k represents one evaluation of a hash function and two memory cell updates of two temporary arrays. The set of edges is
where
defines a path running through all vertices of the i-th block;
connects each vertex of a layer to the corresponding vertex of the subsequent layer by a vertical edge;
is the set of all edges we obtain by connecting the k-th vertex of the j-th layer to the br(k)-th vertex of the subsequent layer (where
denotes the bitreversal function, see [8] ); and
connects the blocks of the r rounds by single edges. Note that each of the r blocks of G R looks like the graph corresponding to the Catena password-hashing function [10] , except for the additional edges E i,2 . Proof: The number of vertices follows easily through a simple enumeration. All the vertices with incoming edges from the set E 4 have indegree 1. All other vertices have at most three incoming edges, one from each of the three sets
The Attack
Secondly, from the description of our graph it is clear that all the edges either stay in the same layer or go to the next layer, which satisfies the first condition of Definition 4. As the edges in one layer form a single simple path, by removing every √ m-th vertex of G R , the longest path in each layer has length at most √ m − 2, so also the second claim is satisfied. 
Comparison for Practical Parameters
We now do an analysis of our attack using practical parameters. We set r = 1 (there is only a single edge between subsequent rounds, therefore the complexity scales linearly with r), λ = 2 (as recommended in [8] ), d = e = √ m (by Lemma 3), δ = 2 (see Remark 1), and apply Theorem 1 to arrive at
Now, we plug in parameters m = 2 33 (1 GB) and g = 2 24 .25 · √R + 1 · √ 3 to optimize the upper bound of our attack's complexity, and reach ER(A R ) ≤ 3 3 2 · 2 59.25 · √R . In [6] we find a value R = 3000 ≈ 2 11.6 for Blake2. We estimate that the value ofR should be correlated and therefore set it to the same value and plug it in. On the other hand, the complexity for the naïve algorithm using the same concrete parameters is ER(N R ) > 3 · 2 67 . Therefore, if we compare these two values we find that the quality of the attack is roughly ENquality =
TwoCats
The password-hashing scheme TwoCats was proposed by Bill Cox [9] . TwoCats consists of two loops, a dataindependent ("resistant") one, followed by a data-dependent ("unpredictable") one. In this paper we will only discuss the data-independent loop. The underlying hash function H is Blake2s or SHA256. As input, TwoCats takes a password, a salt, their sizes, and the desired memory cost. 7 The algorithm for evaluating the data-independent loop of TwoCats from [9] is described in Alg. 2 of the Reference Material. It makes n calls to the underlying hash function (where n is half the memory size divided by the block length); as the naïve algorithm N TC maintains all the memory during the entire computation, it has an energy complexity of
Graph Representation
The corresponding computation graph G TC = (V, E) is defined as follows. Let n = 2 nc be the number of vertices;
where sbr is the sliding-power-of-two bit reversal function:
wherebr(i) removes the leading 1 bit and reverses the remaining bits. (To understand sbr(i), consider the following 7 . In fact, we are only describing a simple version of TwoCats called SkinnyCat, which the author designed for easy implementation. As the underlying DAGs are the same, we won't go into further details. example for i = 24, which is 11000 in binary: cut off the first 1 to get 1000, reverse the bits to getbr(i) = 0001, check if the difference between i andbr(i) is larger than 2 4 + 2, and if so add 2 4 to get sbr(24) = 17.) Note that the indegree of all but the first two nodes is 2.
The Attack
, an edge to node v i of length > 1 has its origin in G k only whenbr(i) = sbr(i), i.e., when i −br(i) ≥ 2 k + 1. Let i = 1acb be the bit representation of such a value i, where a, b ∈ {0, 1} k/2 and c ∈ {0, 1} if k is odd, or c is empty if k is even. Then (letting br stand for bit-reversal)
Since 2 k/2 < b − br(a) < 2 k/2 , the number of edges E in the second half of G k with 1 < length(E) < β is equal to the number of pairs (a, b), such that (a − br(b))2 k/2 < β + 2 k/2 , where the latter is equivalent to a − br(b) < β/2 k/2 + 1. Thus, at most 2 k/2 (β/2 k/2 + 1) < β + 2 k/2 nodes v i can serve as endpoints for such edges. This lemma implies an attack against TwoCats. Corollary 2. There is an attack A TC on TwoCats of complexity ER(A TC ) = O(n 1.75 ).
Proof: We will show that G TC is (ē,d)-reducible for e ≈ n 3/4 andd ≈ n 1/2 . Let G 0 be the subgraph on the vertices v 0 , v 1 and G k for 1 ≤ k < n c be as defined above. Then, by Lemma 1 (applied to α = 1,
and by the convergence of the geometric series, it follows e = O(n 3/4 ), and analogously,d = O(n 1/2 ). Thus, by Theorem 1, we get an attack complexity of O(n 1.75 ). Since N TC has an energy complexity of O(n 2 ), the (asymptotic) quality of the attack is O(n 0.25 ).
Comparison for Practical Parameters
If we set m c = 30 as proposed as an upper bound in [9] , and b l = 2 12 , we get n = 2 25 . Optimizing constants in the proof of Corollary 2, we set β(k) := (R/a) 
Thus, for such a small value for n, our asymptotic result only gives a very small advantage:
2 50 > 1.
Gambit
Gambit is a password-hashing function proposed by Pintér [13] and inspired by the sponge paradigm of Bertoni et al. [4] It is built on top of a sponge with a state consisting of b blocks; the upper part of the state affected directly by absorbing and squeezing consists of r words. As input, Gambit takes a password pwd, salt salt, time and memory complexity parameters t and m respectively, and a key identifier dkid. The construction itself is parametrized by an interleave factor denoted f ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} satisfying several requirements that we will detail later.
The Naïve Algorithm
The algorithm for computing Gambit given in [13] is described in Algorithm 4 in the Reference Material.
We evaluate the memory costs of Algorithm 4 (we call it N g ) in terms of words, while the computational costs will be expressed in terms of calls to the sponge permutation. Note that we are being generous to the naïve algorithm by making all other its computation (e.g., updates to Mem and the sponge absorption steps) for free.
N g maintains the memory consisting of m words during its entire computation (t steps), hence we have cmc(N g ) = O(mt). It performs t calls to the sponge permutation during its operation, hence we get cec(N g ) = O(t). Overall, this gives us ER(N g ) = O(t(m +R)).
Graph Representation
Below we describe the directed acyclic graph that corresponds to the Gambit function in its simplest form, without considering the optional transformations resulting from Trans and ROM. 8 When we refer to i-th absorbing/squeezing/permutation step, we always index from 0 to be consistent with [13] .
We define a directed acyclic graph G g = (V, E) as follows. The set of vertices V consists of three partitions V := V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ V 3 . We let
where for each fixed i, the tuple S i,0 , . . . , S i,b−1 represents the b words of the sponge state after (i − 1)-th application of the sponge permutation π. Additionally,
where for each fixed i, the tuple T i,0 , . . . , T i,r−1 represents the r words of the upper part of the sponge right before the i-th application of the sponge permutation π, but after the i-th absorption. Finally,
where M i,p represents the state of the memory word M [p] after the updates that occurred as a result of the i-th squeezing step. Note that in each round i we only introduce new M -vertices for memory cells that were updated in this round (as captured by the condition ∃j ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} : p = [ir + j] m ). Let us for every v ∈ {S i,j , T i,j , M i,p } ⊆ V define the timestamp of v as ts(v) = i. We describe the set of edges as a union of six partitions E := 6 i=1 E i . The first three sets
capture the dependence of a sponge state on the state immediately preceding it. Edges in
represent the updates of memory Mem based on the current sponge state in each step. The set
contains edges representing the influence of the memory Mem on the update of the sponge state. Intuitively, the index 8 . Including the operation Trans would lead to a similar analysis, while the effects of ROM can be amortized over any number of evaluations of Gambit as the content of ROM remains the same. last(i, j) represents the last iteration in which the memory at position [f (ir + j)] m was overwritten before it is read out and used during iteration i. This is guaranteed by the fact that the vertex M last(i,j),[f (ir+j)] m exists (i.e., this position was updated in iteration last(i, j)) and either last(i, j) < i, or if the update occurs in the current iteration (last(i, j) = i) then it occurred before the value is read out (this is captured by the condition [f j] r > j). Finally, the edges in
represent that whenever updating a memory cell M p , the new value also depends on the old one.
Choice of Parameters
The author of [13] gives some conditions and recommendations on how to choose the parameters. First, m cannot be too big compared to t, otherwise the entire memory is not used, which is captured by the proposed condition m < tr/4. Also, the interleave factor f needs to satisfy gcd(m, f ) = 1 and gcd(m, f − 1) = 1 in order to ensure proper usage of the entire memory and regular behaviour of edge lengths (as we will see shortly), respectively.
For the purposes of our attack we assume that m and t are large compared to b and r, while still evaluating the complexity of the attack in all these parameters. We will restrict to the case m = Θ(t) since the general paradigm of iMHFs is to use as much memory as possible.
The Attack
Intuitively, the weakness of Gambit lies in its distribution of edge lengths: the lengths of relevant edges are distributed almost uniformly (i.e., the number of edges of each particular length is roughly the same), which opens door for an attack following the ideas already sketched in Section 3.1.
In our more detailed analysis below, some of our estimates are not completely precise (indicated by ≈) for two reasons: (1) the edge lengths considered will be scaled down by a factor of r which might cause rounding errors, and (2) the graph looks slightly differently at its "beginning"/"end" compared to normal operation. However, neither of these effects can have a noticeable impact on our results and so we opt for a simpler presentation in this version of the paper.
First we formalize the statement about edge lengths, assuming gcd(m, f ) = gcd(m, f − 1) = 1 as required by [13] . For the purposes of Section 6, we define a slighly different notion of an edge length that we denote by len: for e = (u, v) ∈ E we define the length of e as len(e) := ts(v) − ts(u). Whenever we talk about edge length in this section, we refer to the function len(·). Lemma 5. For any e ∈ 4 i=1 E i we have len(e) ≤ 1. For e ∈ E 6 we have len(e) ≈ m/r. Finally, for e ∈ E 5 we have 0 ≤ len(e) ≤ m/r and the distribution of edgelengths is approximately uniform, that is |{e : len(e) = x}| ≈ tr 2 /m for each x ∈ {1, . . . , m/r}.
Proof: The claim for
4 i=1 E i is easy to observe directly from the definition. For e ∈ E 6 , informally len(e) corresponds to the difference in timestamps between two consecutive updates of a memory cell Mem [p] . Since the memory cells are updated successively, m − 1 updates (of other cells) occur before a cell is updated again. However, r consecutive updates always have the same timestamp, hence we have len(e) = m/r for e ∈ E 6 . Finally, for e ∈ E 5 the length len(e) corresponds to the timestamp difference between updating a memory cell and reading it out. By design of Gambit (due to the requirement gcd(m, f −1) = 1) the number of updates (of other cells) that happen between updating a cell Mem[p] and reading it out is uniformly distributed for various p. This uniformity is approximately maintained also after downscaling the lengths by the factor r due to r updates happening under each timestamp.
This allows us to see G g as a layered graph. Theorem 2. Proof: Let us define the set of nodes to remove as start points of short edges. Namely, we set S = {v ∈ V 3 : ∃e ∈ E 5 , e = (v, w), len(e) ≤ t 3/4 }.
Due to Lemma 5 we have
|S| ≈ t 3/4 · tr 2 m = t 7/4 r 2 m .
Now let us partition
Note that λ ≈ t 1/4 and that every edge e = (v, w) of G g −S has v ∈ V i , w ∈ V j for i ≤ j. It remains to discuss the reducibility of the induced subgraphs
First, let us note that E i is disjoint with both E 5 and E 6 . The former holds since the "short edges" were deleted and the "long edges" step outside V i . For the latter we recall that len(e) ≈ m/r for e ∈ E 6 and the assumed m = Θ(t).
Now we see that len(e) ≤ 1 for every e ∈ E i and so we will treat G i as we would treat a chain graph. Note that This beats the naïve algorithm with its energy complexity of t(m +R) = Ω(t 2 ).
Comparison for Practical Parameters
To go beyond the asymptotic analysis, we set m = tr/4 as suggested by [13] and apply Theorem 1 setting n = |V | ≈ t(b + 2r) and g = e, δ = b). We obtain
where e = max(b + 2r, 4r), and a similar bound for AT R (A g ) (see Theorem 1).
Next, we will argue that the valueR can be replaced withR/b. The valueR upper bounds the cost of calling the sponge function and performing a xor but now Theorem 1 pays the costR for each node of the b output nodes of the sponge function graph. That is b more times then necessary. The remaining computations are xors and are very cheap compared to calling the sponge function, henceR/b still upper-bounds their cost. [13] proposes to use one of the two variants of the Keccak [5] permutation, taking 1600 bits of input and keeping a capacity of either 256 or 512 bits. This gives us b = 25 and r ∈ {12, 17} (recall that these are expressed in words). Using 1GB of memory corresponds to m = 2 27 words. Plugging these values into (1) gives us approximately
62 for values ofR ≤ 5000, not beating the naïve algorithm with ER(A g ) ≈ 2
54 . We stress that the above estimate is overly pessimistic for several reasons related to the difficulty of adapting our model to sponges (namely, representing the state of the sponge as b separate nodes). While this does not affect the asymptotic analysis (where b is considered a constant), it plays a significant role in the concrete evaluation. If the concrete complexity of the attack is a primary goal, we believe that a significant improvement can be obtained by adapting the attack to the sponge structure instead of using the attack of Theorem 1 in a black-box way.
Lyra 2
Lyra 2 is a sponge-based password-hashing function proposed in [11] . It is built on top of a sponge with an internal state consisting of w bits, while its upper part affected directly by absorbing and squeezing consists of b bits. Data is handled as words of length W -let b = β · W and w = α · W . The function is parameterised by R 9 , C, T ∈ N, and runs in two phases: setup and wandering. The setup phase is data-independent and initializes, in a recursive manner, a memory matrix M of dimension R × C where each memory cell is of size b bits. The wandering phase, on the other hand, is data-dependent and updates these memory cells in T iterations. Hence, roughly speaking, R and C are the memory parameters, whereas T is the time parameter. Since the paper pertains only to data-independent MHFs, we shall consider only the setup phase, and hence the algorithm corresponding to T = 0. The description of this reduced Lyra 2 function, denoted N L , is given in Algorithm 5 in the Reference Material.
The Naïve Algorithm
Lyra 2 uses the underlying sponge in two modes of operation: squeeze (which is the normal mode) and duplex (which is squeeze with an input). For sake of simplicity of the analysis, we presume that both modes of the sponge have the same time-cost. Also, since other operationsi.e., xor (⊕), wordwise addition ( ) and rotation (rot) -are accompanied by a call to the permutation function f , we assume their costs are absorbed by the permutation. As the naïve algorithm N L has to save the content of the memory cells M and the state of the sponge in each iteration, its energy complexity is
We show that there exists an attack against the set-up phase of the function by giving an evaluation algorithm A L that requires energy complexity less than that in (2).
9. Not to be confused with the core-memory parameter.
Graph Representation
For showing the aforementioned attack, we first have to describe the graph G L that corresponds to Lyra 2. We warm up with the description of a simplified graph G L,s = G L,s (R, C) in which the state of the sponge and the content of the memory are represented as separate vertices, and then describe how the graph can be attacked. Later, in Section 7.3.1, we show how G L,s can be transformed to G L = G L (R, C, β, α) where vertices represent individual words and hence are of the same weights. We also explain a fine-grained attack in terms of β and α. Figure 5 . A schematic of the first four layers of G L,s -the dependence between these layers are indicated by arrows. All the edges coming into a layer L belong to the previous layer (L −1 ), whereas all the edges going out of the layer are to the next layer (L +1 ) (except for the extreme layers). Refer to Figure 6 for the structure of a particular layer.
G L,s has a layered structure (see Figure 5) , with each layer (L ) having a left (L ,L ) and a right half (L ,R ) -there are λ L = log 2 R − 1 layers altogether. Roughly speaking, in a particular "window" , the memory cells in L ,R are filled by feeding to the sponge function certain values of memory cells from L −1 . At the same time, these values in L −1 are updated to L ,L . And the process is repeated. Thus, G L has three types of vertices, corresponding the state of the sponge (V s ), the (memory) fills (V m ), and (memory) updates (V u ). In particular, V s and V m are always on the right half, whereas V u is on the left half of the layer. 10 A more concrete description follows.
Let Λ(i) = log 2 i for i > 4 and
. Each vertex has a type (s, m or u) and is indexed by its row number, column number and its level, and in that order. The vertices are:
As the first four rows of the memory are filled a differently from the rest, L 1 has a different structure from the rest of the layers. In the description of the edges, however, we treat this layer as the rest for the sake of a clear description. But this does not change affect the attacks.
The edges can be classified into three: the edges that correspond to the state of the sponge (E 1 , E 2 ), a fill (E 3 ) and an update (E 4 ). A detailed description of the edges follow -henceforth, E x,y denotes the yth part in the edge set E x ; for example, E 1 below equals E 1,1 ∪ E 1,2 .
Intuitively, row(·) and prev(·) can be seen as a set of permutations between the layers. For example, each element in L 3,R has a unique predecessor each in L 3,L and L 2 . Concretely, for a given i, row 1 (i) and prev 1 (i) are defined as:
where we use plus if Λ(i) is odd, minus if Λ(i) is even. If i = 3, then we set row 1 (3) = 1 and prev 1 (3) = 0.
The Attack
Proof: L has at total of 3 · C2 vertices, C2 each from V s , V m and V u . Thus, by the sum of a geometric series, the number of vertices in
The vertex with the highest indegree is in V s -thus, the indegree of the graph is four. As for Part 2 of the claim, consider a particular layer L . The edges that remain in the layer are (subsets of):
Thus, L is a 2 × C grid as shown in Figure  6 . It turns out that the structure is not ( 
This is accomplished by deleting certain "rows" and "columns" entirely. The columns (resp., rows) that are removed are subsets of V m (resp., V s and V u ) at regular 2 ψ (resp., C χ ) intervals, where 0 ≤ χ, ψ ≤ 1. As a result, the whole grid is subdivided into 2 ·(1−ψ) C 1−χ sub-grids with the property that there are no edges between any two. The number of vertices removed is 2 · C 1−χ − 1 + C · 2 (1−ψ) , and the longest path in this sub-grid is 2 · 2 ψ · C χ long. Figure 6 . The structure of L 3 for G L,s with C = 4 -the edges going out to the next layer and coming in from the previous layer have been omitted. For the sake of presentation, we have flipped the direction of odd columns (i.e., the blue columns 1, 3, 5, 7 -equivalently, columns 9, 11, 13, 15 in the function). The blue (circular) nodes represent the state of the sponge (∈ Vs), the green (square) nodes represents a memory fill (∈ Vm) whereas a red (diamond) node represents an update (∈ Vu). Hence, the blue and green nodes belong to L 3,R , whereas the red nodes belong to L 3,L . The path with the (thicker) blue edges corresponds to the state of the sponge.
7.3.1. Extending to vertices of arbitrary weights.
, we replace the vertices and edges in G L,s in a similar vein to Gambit. Intuitively, we are constructing a graph corresponding to Lyra 2 where all the vertices have the same weight as that of a word. Each vertex v ∈ V m , V u is replaced by a set of vertices
On the other hand, each vertex s ∈ V s is replaced by a graph G u = (s, E s ) that represents the sponge function (see Figure 7) . The vertices are
where I, O and J stand for "input", "output" and "junction", respectively. The edges consist of {(s I,k , s J,k ) : k ∈ [0, β)}, along with the complete bipartite graph K α,α between the vertices {s J,0 . . . s J,β−1 , s I,β . . . s I,α−1 } and s O . Therefore, |s| = 2 · α + β and |E s | = (α 2 + β).
. . .
. . . 
An edge
11 Thus, given G L,s , one can construct G L . In addition, it is not difficult to see that G L also captures the computation of the function.
Proof: Note that the number of vertices of each type (i.e., s, m and u) in G L,s are the same: C · (R − 2). Thus, from the description of the transformation, the number of
The node with the maximum indegree in G L is either the output node of s or the junction node of s -the former has an indegree α, whereas the latter 4. That establishes Part 1. Now, recall the strategy described for a layer L in the proof of Part 2 of Lemma 6. For every vertex of type m (resp., u) that is removed in G L , remove all the corresponding vertices m (resp., u). In addition, for vertex of type s removed, remove the corresponding output vertices s O . A straightforward recalculation shows that the number of vertices removed are
whereas, the resulting depth is 2 · 2 2 ψ C χ , where the additional factor of two arises due to the introduction of G u (which has depth 2). 
). Finally, applying Theorem 1 with g = R 1/3 establishes the corollary. 13 Since N L has an energy complexity of O(R 2 ) = O(n 2 ), the (asymptotic) quality of the attack is O(n 0.33 ).
Comparison for Practical Parameters
We evaluate the attack for 1GB of RAM on a 64-bit machine -that is, W = 64 bits and, thus, the memory consists of 2 27 words. We consider the two permutation functions that were suggested in the paper: 11 . To be precise, the edges have to be treated a bit differently to account for the and the rot operations (presuming that the number of rotations is a product of W , as recommended). However, this changes nothing with regards to the attacks and so we avoid it in favour of a cleaner exposition.
12. The recommended value is C ≥ ρmax/ρ, where ρmax is the regular number of rounds for the underlying sponge and ρ is the reduced number of rounds. Therefore, C = 1 in case the full rounds are used.
13. The attack is asymptotically worse for the case C = R. We have n = O(R 2 ), and by substituting χ = ψ = 1/2, we getd = O(R) andē = O(R 3/2 ). Finally, applying Theorem 1 with g =ē, we get ER(A L ) = O(R 7/2 ) = O(n 1.75 ).
1) 512-Keccak with an internal state of size 1600b: i.e., α K = 1600/64 = 25, and β K = 512/64 = 8; and 2) 512-Blake2b with an internal state of size 1024b: i.e., α B = 1024/64 = 16, and β B = 512/64 = 8. Note that the naïve algorithm in has an energy complexity of ≈ (2 · 2 27 ) · 2 3 = 2 57 . For establishing concrete bounds, the analysis has to be more fine-grained than in the proof of Corollary 4. The attack performs the best for 512Blake2b with full rounds of computation (i.e., ρ = ρ max and C = 1) withĒ = 3000. On plugging in the values of e and d from Part 2 of Theorem 3 with χ = 1 into Lemma 2 we getd
. Finally, applying Theorem 1 with
and ψ = 0..23 to get ER(A L ) ≈ 2 59.5 . Thus, the quality of the attack is ≈ 1/6. The complexity for other settings is strictly worse.
POMELO
POMELO is a password-hashing function proposed by [15] . It is parametrized by m, t ∈ N.
It consists of a data-independent and a data-dependent phase. After an initial setup of a chunk of σ = 2 m memory cells, both phases iterate 2 t−1 times through the chunk of memory. Both phases employ a pseudorandom number generator. The first RNG is data-independent while the second one is data-dependent. Apart from using different RNGs the two phases work the same way. We will only consider the initialization and data-independent phase. During these POMELO iterates τ = 1 + 2 t−1 times through the memory chunk for a total of T = τ σ steps.
By the specification, t can be chosen between 0 and 25 while m can be chosen between 8 and 33.
14 Furthermore, a parameter w which will specify the size of a memory window is fixed as 2 12 in the specification. Algorithm 6 in the Reference Material outlines the dataindependent part of the POMELO Algorithm as described in [15] , which we shall refer to as N P . The naïve algorithm maintains the whole memory of size σ memory cells during the entire computation (τ σ iterations), therefore we have cmc(N P ) = O(σ 2 τ ). IfR is the coreenergy ratio of the bit operations performed during one iteration, we have cec(N P ) = O(στR), for a total of ER(N P ) = O(στ (σ +R)).
Graph Representation
The RNG defines one single deterministic sequence of 64-bit numbers r i , σ ≤ i < T . This sequence is indepedent of the input and the parameters of the algorithm and defined via Algorithm 7 in the Reference Material. We define r high i 14. If t = 0, the data-independent phase iterates through the first half of memory and the data-dependent phase over the second half.
as the upper 48 bits of r i , taken modulo σ, and r low i as the lowest 13 bits of r i . These sequences will now define two sequences i and g i of indices to memory cells. We interpret them as "local" and "global" memory indices, and these define the memory cells to be updated at time i. Henceforth all indices to memory cells are implicitly taken modulo σ. For i ≥ σ, set i = i − w + r low i . Due to the range of r low i it means that i ∈ [p − w, p + w). For i ≥ σ, set g i = r high i if i is divisible by 32 and g i = g i−1 +1 otherwise. If i < σ we don't define i and g i as we don't update "randomly" selected memory cells during the first iteration, i.e. initialization, through the memory matrix.
For a given set of parameters σ, τ we now define a directed acyclic graph G P = (V, E) as follows.
The vertices M i,p correspond to updates of memory cell at position p at time i. At each time step i, only three memory cells are updated, at locations p = i mod σ, i and g i , though the memory cell at p is updated three times. Formally, we define the vertex set of updated cells at time
In the latter case we let M i,p and M i,p be alternative names for M i,p . Together we get the vertex set V = 0≤i<T V i
As for Gambit, for a vertex v ∈ V i we define the timestamp of v as ts(v) = i. Define last(i, p) to be the last time before step i when memory cell p was updated. More formally, last(i, p) := max {ts(M j,p ) :
We define the edge set as the union of the following sets:
Before explaining the intuition behind these edge sets, define the length of an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E as len(e) = ts(v) − ts(u). Again, thoughout this section by edge length we always refer to the quantity len(·). For an edge e = (M j,p , M i,p ) we define the reach of e as reach(e) = i − p mod σ, as the edge reaches reach(e) memory cells back. If p = i and j < i we define reach(e) = σ rather than 0. Note that the length of an edge is at most its reach, as memory cell p was updated i − p mod σ time steps ago.
Then E S are short edges reaching just a few memory cells back. Their length is at most 13. E Z contains zerolength edges between memory cells updated during one step. E L contains local "random" edges that refer to memory cells close to the current memory cell i while E G contains global "random" edges. Finally, E M contains the edges from the old to the new state of the main memory cell during an update. Edges from E M always have reach σ.
We shall also consider the graph G P derived from G P by contracting the vertices from V i into a single one for each i and removing loops. Note that this is a chain graph with additional edges, and the length of an edge in this graph reflects the length in the original graph. G P has T vertices with indegree at most 7, while G P has ≈ 5T vertices with indegree at most 5.
8.1.1. Edge Length Distribution. Recall that the RNG provides a sequence r i of length (T − σ) of 64-bit integers. Any such sequence r i gives rise to a graph in the way outlined in the previous section. We shall consider the set S P of such graphs over all such sequences r i with uniform distribution. Lemma 7. Let β σ ∈ [w, σ − w] and β w ∈ [13, w], and consider a graph G randomly sampled from S P , after contracting the vertex sets V i . The expected number of edges of length between w and β σ is at most (3.5β σ /σ)(T −σ). The expected number of edges of length between 13 and β w is at most (1.5β w /w + 3β w /σ)(T − σ).
Proof:
We first wish to estimate the number of edges of length between w and β σ . Recall that the length of an edge is always at most the reach of that edge, so we do not need to consider edges of reach less than w.
Case 1: Edges with reach between w and β σ +w. Notice that local edges e ∈ E L either have reach less than w or greater than σ − w. Edges from E M have reach σ so only global edges can have reach between w and β σ + w. Due to uniform distribution of the random numbers, we get that the expected ratio of global edges with reach between w and β σ + w is β σ /σ.
Case 2: Edges with reach greater than β σ + w. All edges of E M , expectedly half of the edges of E L and an expected ratio of (σ − β σ − w)/σ edges from E G have reach greater than β σ + w. So for a given vertex in G , the expected number of incoming edges with reach greater than β σ + w is 1 + 0.5 + (σ − β σ − w)/σ ≤ 2.5. We want to estimate how many of these edges have short length.
So assume we have a vertex M i,p and let I := [i − β σ , i − w]. We want to estimate the probability that the set of vertices with timestamp j for j ∈ I contains a vertex M j,p referring to memory cell p. The probability that p was chosen as a global memory index, i.e. that g j = p for some j ∈ I, is (β σ − w)/σ. If p was chosen as local memory index for some j ∈ I, then we must have p ∈ [(i − β σ ) − w, (i − w) + w], i.e. p is in a local window around I. But this means the reach of (M j,p , M i,p ) is less than β σ + w, so we already considered that edge in Case 1.
So taking both cases together, for a given vertex in G we get an overall expected number of at most 2.5(β σ − w)/σ + β σ /σ ≤ 3.5β σ /σ incoming edges of length between w and β σ . As we have T vertices in G in total and the first σ vertices do not have any local or global incoming edges, we get the first result.
A similar analysis yields the second result. While the POMELO specification does not mention any properties expected from the random number generator, we will now assume that the edge length distribution G P is similar to the expected distribution of a randomly sampled graph from S P . In particular we will assume that the properties postulated in Lemma 7 also apply to G P .
The Attack
We will now outline the attack on G P . Let β σ ∈ [w, σ] and assume we remove all vertices that have incoming edges of length between w and β σ . Then by Lemma 1, for any γ σ we can remove wT /γ σ further vertices such that the depth of the remaining graph is at most γ σ T /β σ . This is achieved by removing chunks of w consecutive vertices, every γ σ vertices. Thus the factor of γ σ represents an upper bound for the length of the longest path only using edges of length at most w. We wish to improve upon this upper bound by removing some more vertices.
So consider a chunk of N := γ σ consecutive vertices in G P . Let β w ∈ [13, w] and assume we remove all vertices that have incoming edges of length between 13 and β w . Then again, by Lemma 1, for any γ w we can remove 13N/γ w vertices such that the depth of the remaining graph is at most γ w N/β w .
Using this new upper bound for the length of the longest path only using edges of length at most w, we obtain an overall bound on the depth of γ w N/β w (T /β σ ) = T γσ βσ γw βw . This was achieved by deleting wT /γ σ + 13T /γ w vertices, and vertices with incoming edges of certain lengths.
Applying Lemma 7 to estimate the total, we get that in order to reduce the depth to T γσ βσ γw βw , the number of vertices to be deleted is at most T (3.5β σ /σ + 1.5β w /w + 3β w /σ + w/γ σ + 13/γ w ).
Notice that if we translate this result back to the original graph G P , the number of vertices deleted is at most 5 times as high, and similarly the longest remaining path is at most 5 times as long, so asymptotically we obtain the same result. We shall now try to find values for β σ , γ σ , β w , γ w that allow for an attack on Pomelo. Again, as with Gambit, we focus on the case τ = O(1) since with iMHFs we want to use as much memory as possible. Let's write w = σ c for some c. If we then set β σ = σ (2+c)/3 , γ σ = σ (1+2c)/3 , β w = σ 2c/3 , γ w = σ c/3 , we get the graph is (σ e , σ 2/3 )-reducible for e = max( Notice that if we treat w like a constant instead (i.e. c = 0), we can obtain an algorithm with asymptotic energy complexity of O(σ 7/4 ) via the remark from Lemma 1.
Comparison for Practical Parameters
The POMELO specification does not suggest specific choices for the time and memory parameters. We shall choose σ = 2 25 , such that the memory usage is 2 30 bytes, or 1 GB. We set t = 4 so that T = 2 29 . With this choice the memory cost is still proportionally high while the graph has a large proportion of local and global random edges (which are missing during the first iteration through the memory matrix). Setting the parameters as in Corollary 5 does not yield a sensible attack as e > T , meaning we delete all vertices to reduce the depth of the graph. This is due to the large constant 13 not being taken into account by the asymptotic result. Treating the memory window w like a constant and only doing one of the depth reduction steps is therefore more sensible. We shall set β σ = 2 19 and γ σ = 2 16 , estimate the number of edges of length between w and β σ via Lemma 7 and apply Lemma 1. If we set the core-energy ratio of the bit operations performed toR = 100 (which is a very conservative estimate and is in practice likely much lower) we then get an estimate of ER(A P ) ≈ 2 63 , compared to ER(N P ) ≈ 2 54 for the naïve algorithm.
